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1. INTRODUCTION
In trying to discover how disputes were settled bymediation in Anglo-Saxon England, I found that thepractice must have relied on a quite sophisticated law
of property. In a dispute between a religious house and the
heir of someone who had given it land, the mediators could
suggest and the parties regularly accepted the grant of a life
interest to the heir, provided no objection was made to the
assembly confirming the house’s title. The Fonthill Case is
the best known example of such a dispute (“The Fonthill
Letter” in Michael Korhammer ed Words, Texts and
Manuscripts:Studies in Anglo-Saxon Culture Presented to Helmutt
Gneuss on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday Cambridge,
Brewer 1992 53–97). A life interest at any time must
incorporate implied terms of considerable refinement,
relating to waste if nothing else and probably restrictions
on alienation. The first relevant legislation was the
Provisions of Westminster 1259 (re-enacted by the Statute
of Marlborough 1267) but the implied terms remained
largely a Common Law matter. What supplied those
terms? It could only be customary law. But where had it
come from and how had it developed? I decided to start at
the beginning.
A recent article in Nature shows that there were humans
in England more than 700,000 years ago (Simon Parfitt
(and 18 others) “The earliest record of human activity in
Northern Europe,” 438 Nature issue 7070 15 December
2005, pp1008–12). There is evidence from studies of the
hypoglossal canal, tongue nerves and earbones that they
have been living in communities and talking to one another
for at least 300,000 years. Those were our hominid
cousins, like us in many basic ways, social as well as genetic.
We know nothing yet of any rules by which they lived. The
recent discovery of a jawbone suggests that homo sapiens,
our own kind, has lived here for more than 37,000 years.
That seems to be the earliest realistic starting point for a
study of law in England.
We cannot blame the older historians for not starting
their stories then. Archaeology and anthropology made
their first dependable and necessary contributions only in
the last century. Holdsworth, like all historians of his time,
believed in the invasion of Angles, Saxons and Jutes and
that: “we must begin the continuous history of England
and of English law with the coming of those tribes to
England in 449.” But the new Oxford History of the Laws of
England is intended to start even later, about AD900,
except for Canon Law. I hope to show there was law in
England before that which makes an essential difference to
how we should look at the later law.
2. THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW
Definition comes first. There used to be those who
thought that a distinction should be drawn between laws
proceeding from a central state authority and the rest,
which they preferred to call custom, something less than
law. But whether customary law is law is not just a matter
of nomenclature. It is a matter of scientific taxonomy, with
perhaps a dash of ideology. Customary law is just as much
law as folk music is music. It is the only law everywhere
until states and writing and jurisprudence come along, just
as all music is undifferentiated until it becomes the subject
of professional attention.
Customary law is not sparse. It does whatever is needed
and performs some of the same functions wherever and
whenever it applies. It is likely to determine who you can
marry, what marriage means, who succeeds to a dead
person’s property and, most important, how order can be
restored after violence. Why should we not call that law?
The English always did, as soon as they started writing
about it.
Wherever humans are found they are social animals. A
permanent group is necessary for the survival of human
young. Extended families have relations with wider kin and
they congregate with different kin groups at certain times
for agreed purposes: I use “kin”, “clan” and “group” with
no attempt to discriminate scientifically. If great care is
taken, one may argue that some characteristics of modern
communal societies are likely to be the same as those in
earlier societies which archaeology shows had similar ways
of life, despite Maitland’s elegant dismissal (FW Maitland
‘The Body Politic’ in HAL Fisher ed The Collected Papers of
Frederic William Maitland Cambridge, Cambridge UP 3 vols
1911 repr Abingdon, Professional Books, 1983 III p300):
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I have a special dread of those theorists who are trying to fill
up the dark ages of medieval history with laws collected from
the barbarian tribes that have been observed in modern
days…. If I see a set of trucks standing on a railway line
from week to week, I do not say, This is the main up line to
London. I say, This must be a siding. The traveller who has
studied the uncorrupted savage can often tell the historian of
medieval Europe what to look for, never what to find.
Those who can write as well as that are usually inspired
to do so when they know they are being naughty, but I am
happy to heed the warning.
Customary law is not simple, any more than so-called
primitive languages. Communal life allows less privacy.
There is little chance of antisocial conduct passing
unnoticed or being attributed to the wrong person.
Sanctions are often immediate and applied until they work,
that is until the culprits give up their antisocial behaviour,
or have their capacity to misbehave removed. Much of
customary law’s complexity stems from the group’s
concern to control more of what is now considered
private. For example, the smallness of the group requires a
wider definition of incest. All the members of any
communal group know the rules in detail and expect
punishment for their breach. Everywhere in modern
communal societies there are legal rules of a complexity,
sophistication and abundance that modern lawyers find
hard to comprehend (Peter Lawrence The Garia: An
Ethnography of a Traditional Cosmic System in Papua New Guinea,
Melbourne, Melbourne UP 1984). There is every reason
to believe that was so in prehistoric England. As the power
of the state grew, law developed by simplification not
elaboration.
Modern law has categories: public and private; civil and
criminal; property and obligations. Customary law does
not, all law being one, consecrated by long use, general
acceptance and the group’s beliefs. It cannot be openly
questioned by anyone on the grounds of utility or fairness.
It is an essential attribute of the group. Yet it is always
assumed, for that very reason, that to find it you must look
for whatever rules produce a result in the best interests of
the group. Expediency is all, whatever formula is needed to
produce it, as it is today in the nuclear powers’ treatment
of international law. The ideology of the group insists that
customary law is unchanging and unchangeable but it
constantly responds to new challenges, particularly
technological, without any intention of reform, perhaps
before there was even the idea of progress.
3. SOURCES
We can be sure that from time immemorial there has
been plenty of that kind of customary law in England even
though there is little to tell us what it was before written
records start two thousand years ago. Most of them are
unreliable but there is the better evidence of archaeology,
which, though it says nothing directly about law, tells us
much about what was going on. Though hard to interpret,
the archaeological evidence has one great advantage: it is
affected only by the touch of the enquirer, not by its
creator, who could rarely have had any thought of its
significance for the future, let alone for historians. Literary
remains are twice tainted, by what both writer and reader
want.
4. PREHISTORIC SOCIETY
So we start in prehistoric times. For the first 35,000
years or so of habitation by homo sapiens, until about
750BC, England was lightly populated, with many
communities little larger than an extended family. Larger
groupings were based on kin. There is plenty of evidence
that they gathered together for social purposes. If families
do not attend such gatherings, they live in backwardness,
says Homer in a precocious flash of anthropological
insight: “they have no assemblies where counsel is taken
nor customary laws, themistes” (Odyssey 9.112; Derek
Roebuck Ancient Greek Arbitration Oxford, Holo Books
2001, p70).
Stone Age people had fed themselves by gathering food
in the wild or by hunting. They gradually added farming,
which allowed them to cluster more densely but required
the exchange of stock for breeding, if not the trading of
surplus (Francis Pryor Britain BC: Life in Britain and Ireland
Before the Romans London, Harper Perennial 2004, p111).
It used to be accepted that farming was introduced by an
“invading wave” from abroad but archaeological
scholarship (particularly mitochondrial DNA tests) does
not now support that. Indeed, modern archaeology finds
little evidence of “invading waves” at any time.
The first hunter-gatherer-farmers were still nomadic but
eventually, probably after c3,000BC, they foraged abroad
less often and came to settle on a piece of land they called
their own. Not in individual ownership, of course, but as
part of the clan, inalienable, belonging to all its members,
dead and living and still to be born, in the temporary
stewardship of those alive who represented the clan.
Is it not inconceivable that the people, who four
thousand years ago devised Stonehenge or over three
thousand years ago used the exquisite gold cups now in the
British Museum, had not worked out a legal system for
coping with at least some of their differences in a peaceful
way, with rules and replicable routines and the
expectations of fairness they arouse?
There is evidence of trade in the Old Stone Age,
including half-finished flint tools and Baltic amber in the
form of beads. There was cross-Channel trade for 3,000
years before the Romans interfered with it. Wrecks off
Devon and Kent show it included trade in scrap metal (see
T W Potter and Catherine Johns, Roman Britain London,
British Museum, new edn 2002, p13). Is it likely that there
were no disputes which required customary law and
practice for their resolution?24
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The artefacts buried in a round barrow at Lockington,
south of Derby, may have been intended to recognise a
settlement, around 2000BC. They include two decorated
gold armlets, not a pair, and a long copper dagger made in
Brittany and still in its scabbard. Rather than assume these
were intended to accompany some dead man to another
world, would it not be simpler – though of course still the
merest speculation – to suggest that the parties to a dispute
gave each other an armlet and with them buried the
hatchet, or rather the dagger, significantly sheathed?
The most compelling object, however, was made of
polished flint about 3200BC and, though found not in
England but at Knowth in County Meath, is of direct
relevance. It is a stylised human head, about the size of my
fists, of polished brown and white flint, with a great gaping
mouth. It has a slot which shows it was meant to be fitted
on to the top of a staff. Do we know anything about such
“speaking-staffs” in other times and places? We do indeed!
Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey are full of descriptions of
assemblies (see Iliad 18.497–508). The references to other
passages in the Iliad and Odyssey and in later literature are in
Ancient Greek Arbitration, where the speaking-staff is more
fully discussed.
Men were crowded together in an assembly. A dispute had
been stirred up there, and two men were disputing about the
reconciliation-payment for a man who had been killed….
The elders sat on polished stones in a sacred circle and one
after another took the speaking-staff of the shouting marshals
in their hand and adjudicated.
The elders are given seats on polished stones in the
sacred circle, as I know they did in living memory in the
Cook Islands. Each elder takes the speaking-staff from one
of the marshals and speaks out in turn. No speaking-staff
has so far been found by archaeologists in Greece, to my
knowledge, but it would not be surprising if the imagery
were similar to the Knowth macehead. The wide-open
mouth has double significance. It proclaims the authority
of the president of the assembly to conduct proceedings.
He or his marshal calls for order and he decides who shall
speak. Only one person may speak at a time and that is the
one holding the staff, a convention which all must honour
at the risk of being shunned as a lout. That is the dramatic
point of the earlier passage in the Iliad, when Achilles, the
celebrity superstar athlete, behaves so petulantly, turning
on his commander-in-chief Agamemnon, who has taken
his slave girl (Iliad 1.224–45):
You drunk with the face of a dog and the heart of a doe, you
never have the guts to fight... you just take the booty of
anyone who stands up to you…. You listen to me – I swear
a great oath by this staff which the Greeks hold in their hands
when they turn over their judgments in their minds – they
who look after customary law, themis, for Zeus – I swear
you this great oath – you’ll be sorry!
And he does the unthinkable – he throws the staff down.
That was in the Bronze Age in Greece. The festuca of the
Roman lictor, which Gaius (Institutes 4.16) said was used
like a spear as a sign of rightful authority, iusti dominii,
reappears in the Lex Salica: Pactus Legis Salicae 46.1 (see Paul
Fouracre “Disputes in Later Merovingian Francia” in
Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre eds The Settlement of
Disputes in Early Medieval Europe Cambridge, Cambridge UP
1986). Some Australian aboriginal communities still use
what is translated as the “talking-stick”. Could the many
so-called “maceheads”, of stone or horn, found in England
from that time, have served the same purpose?
By the end of the Iron Age, there were in England large
tribes, some led by chiefs who would be kings, who not
only had been using iron tools for centuries but farmed
much the same land we do, with many of the same crops,
who drove light traps on made roads, drank imported
wines and dressed in smart clothes in bright colours. That
was how the Romans found them. Tacitus said they were
related to the Gauls (Tacitus Agricola 11). Could their
customary laws have been similar? Julius Caesar tells a
likely story in Gallic War 6.13–14:
[The druids] are the ones who lay down the law,
constituunt, for almost all disputes, public and private, and
whether something is considered a crime, and whether there
has been a killing, and if there is a dispute about inheritance
or boundaries they settle it. They lay down remedies and
penalties.
We may accept Caesar’s word that the Gauls relied on
druids to state the law, which they kept in their memory.
Their British kin had similar druids, and it is likely that
they did the same. Druids or no, those well developed
British communities had some systems of customary law
which continued after the Romans set up their colonial
government with its own laws for some people in some
parts of England, and there is evidence that those systems
continued to be influential long after the Romans had
gone.
5. THE ROMANS
The literature allows a few, unconnected glimpses of
how Roman law and administration affected the people
who lived here then. The Romans never imposed a civil
administration over all within their borders. Britannia had
many unsettled areas, and only some of them were subject
to Roman military occupation. Like the later Germans and
Danes, they found England easier to dominate than
control. The imperial administration, where it could, co-
opted existing tribal leaders and strengthened their control
so long as they performed the functions the Romans
allotted them. From the Romans’ point of view, the most
important was to keep order. The colonial administration
governed the settled areas, with a small staff of civil
servants. Its legal system applied mutatis mutandis in
Britannia much as it did in other provinces. The argument
is made more fully by Andrew Lintott Imperium Romanum: 25
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Politics and Administration London, Routledge 1993; Joan
Liversidge Britain in the Roman Empire New York, Praeger
1968 particularly Chapter 11; and Derek Roebuck and
Bruno de Loynes de Fumichon Roman Arbitration Oxford,
Holo Books 2004 pp8–10.
The Romans required only those who were citizens to
transact their private business according to Roman law.
They recognised the customary laws of the various groups,
of tribe, clan, trade, or religion. In those parts of Britain
where delegated administration was not possible, disputes
which did not attract the attention of the military
command were no doubt dealt with according to
customary law as they had been before the Romans came
and were after they left. There is nothing to tell us how that
worked or of the content of those customary laws.
In AD212 the Constitutio Antoniniana gave full citizenship
to all free inhabitants of the empire. But what happened in
practice? As Tony Honoré puts it (Tony Honoré “Roman
Law AD200–400: From Cosmopolis to Rechstaat?” in
Simon Swain and Mark Edwards Approaching Late Antiquity:
the Transformation from Early to Late Empire, pp109–32,
114–6):
The provincial governor will reach a decision after ascertaining
what has been decided in the town in question in disputes of
the kind with which he is now faced, since preceding
custom and the reason that led to the adoption of the
custom must be respected.
The magistrates were appointed from the local
landowning class or local chiefs, depending on the district,
and knew the customary law as well as anyone. The
governor, when he had to be involved, would take care to
take advice and apply the local law.
When the legions were withdrawn and the colonial
administration lost control, it would be surprising if the
Romano-Britons did not continue to consider themselves
bound by Roman law as their own customary law. What
other legal system could they have had by which they would
all abide? Gildas wrote that Magnus Maximus had put an
end to the rule of Roman law when he grabbed power
from the authorities as early as AD387. For then Britannia
was: “keeping the Roman name but not the custom and
law” (Gildas De Excidio Britanniae 13.1: nomen Romanum nec
tamen morem legemque tenens). That seems to be a
straightforward enough assertion. It was common enough
to keep a personal Roman name and Britannia and its
people the Britones were still called that in Latin for
centuries. But it cannot be true that Roman law and
practice completely disappeared. Many people lived in the
towns, of which there were more in Roman times than for
centuries to come. Indeed, according to various estimates
the population may have reached a peak of three or even
four million, higher than it was at the time of Domesday
Book. How many Romano-Britons stayed? It is hard to
imagine more than a few thousand emigrating without
their influx being recorded where they settled, as it was in
Brittany (see Pierre-Roland Giot, Philippe Guigon and
Bernard Merdrignac The British Settlement of Brittany: the First
Bretons in Armorica Stroud, Tempus 2003). If the population
was, say, two and a half million and only one per cent of
them were well-off and “Romanised”, that would mean
that there were about 25,000 left to exercise privilege and
influence and to carry on such parts of the Roman way of
life as they could afford, if they wanted to.
6. ANGLO-SAXONS
But then the Germans came. The traditional story
comes from Bede’s Ecclesiastical History, written three
hundred years after the events (Bertram Colgrave and RAB
Mynors eds Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English People
Oxford, Oxford UP 1969).
He tells us that the first forces came in just three long
ships and that they were followed by great waves of
migrants – “Angles, Saxons and Jutes” – who invaded
different parts of Britain and drove out the British
population. The archaeological evidence does not now
support that. For example, Nicholas Higham’s work has
convinced him that:
By the late sixth century, the Anglo-Saxon world was peopled
by a cross-bred community with far more British than
Germanic genes (Nicholas Higham Rome, Britain and the
Anglo-Saxons London, Seaby 1992 pp15, 234, 235,
although there are scholars who dispute this).
All the various groups, British and German and mixed,
had their own customary laws. Between individuals from
different clans, or between clans themselves, there must be
some acceptable process. In England that was the feud, an
integral part of the world of the clan (JM Wallace-Hadrill
Early Germanic Kingship in England and on the Continent
Oxford Oxford UP 1971 p14 and “The Bloodfeud of the
Franks” in The Long-Haired Kings London Methuen 1962,
Toronto, University of Toronto Press reprint, 1982). It is
easy to misunderstand the feud if it is thought of first as
private war. It may come to that, just as a dispute between
modern businesses may end in litigation. The threat is
always there but not one in a hundred does, otherwise no
society could work. The purpose of the feud is settlement,
to find a solution acceptable to both sides. The threat of
violence is basic and taken for granted, as is the convention
that a transfer of value may buy it off. That value is
assessable by customary law. It must be enough for the
injured party to accept it honourably as a substitute for
retaliation but not more than it would be proper for the
offending party to pay. Someone other than the parties may
have to say what amount is right according to customary
law and in the circumstances. The wronged kin’s blood is
cooler than the wronged individual’s. Wiser heads have
more interest in a settlement than bloody vengeance.
The amount depends not just on the severity of the
wrong but also on the status of the wronged. You cannot
buy off the duty to retaliate for an injury to the mighty as26
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cheaply as you can an injury to a slave. The wrong may be
so great that no payment will suffice, though that is rare.
What is finally offered may not be accepted, at least at first.
There is a period set for settlement through compromise;
only if all else fails does violence follow and even then it
may be formal.
By the fifth century, the ties of kinship had slackened.
Anglo-Saxon kings were from the start leaders of bands of
warriors from different clans, bound together not by ties of
blood but loyalty to chiefs who needed to be able to control
their peoples not only by force when they were physically
present themselves or by deputy but by their authority
without force. By a system of laws they could provide for
exceptional challenges to their “peace.”
Within a century, most of the British kingdoms had
fallen under Anglo-Saxon overlordship. There is nothing to
show how that affected the application of customary law.
But once the edicts of Anglo-Saxon kings were reduced to
writing they show that, though they drew many distinctions
and recognised many different categories of person, they
were directed not just at those of recent German stock but
at everyone within their jurisdiction. They attempted to
impose a simplified uniform legal order in matters they
considered important.
7. THE FIRST WRITTEN LAWS
I now turn to showing how an understanding of
customary law can enlighten the study of those first written
laws. The first legislation had been oral adjudications in
specific cases, in which the king declared the law on which
he or some delegated body would make or had made a
decision on the facts. The Anglo-Saxons called them
dooms, decisions. These statements of the specific
application of general principles of customary law were
remembered for future use. Later, they were written down
by those who wanted them kept. The successful party
would want a record. Anyone who wanted them to have a
wider reach than the original parties would make use of
writing, if they could, to establish and publish them. That
might be the king, for the use of those he deputed to
mediate and arbitrate and adjudicate on his behalf. The
clergy, too, had an interest in establishing their new
privileges which the dooms proclaimed. This first English
legislation was intended for those who applied the law, not
those who were expected to abide by it. At first it was a
matter of governmental indifference whether those who
were ruled knew of its existence as long as those who
imposed it did.
8. LAWSPEAKERS
All members of a community are assumed to know the
law to which they are subject but, in societies which do not
rely on writing, often there are those, either elders
generally or someone given the task specifically, who can be
called on, when a dispute is heard, to tell the tribunal and
the parties what the law is. Gildas criticised the
unsatisfactory “tyrants” who “rarely look for the rule of
correct judgment.” Where could they have found it? The
Gifts of Men, an Anglo-Saxon poem of unknown date lists
the various talents which God distributes, including those
of “lawspeakers” (GP Krapp and E van Kirk Dobbie eds,
The Exeter Book New York, Columbia UP 1936 p138 lines
41–3):
One in a meeting prudent of mind
Can further consider the rules of the people,
Where elders are gathered crowded together.
That is the man who is called on to declare the
customary law, the ‘rules of the people’, folcrædenne. Thirty
lines later in the poem, separated by the distribution of
many different talents to different men, comes (at p139
lines 72–3) another lawspeaker:
One knows dooms where the retainers
Work out their counsel.
That is the man whose memory can be called on to
provide the king’s own declarations of law, to an assembly
where the king’s men are meeting to work out what advice
they should give or what decision to make. Both these
experts must have belonged to an early stage of the Anglo-
Saxon kingdoms, before the dooms were first written down
and became easier to get at for anyone who could read.
9. AETHELBERHT
This began to change in AD597 when the Pope sent
Augustine to the Anglo-Saxon court of Aethelberht of
Kent. Neither Augustine’s team nor the British clergy were
literate in Anglo-Saxon. Yet somehow in Kent royal
statements of law were first written down in that language.
By whom? If Bede is to be believed (see Bede Ecclesiastical
History I 25) the answer is clear:
So on this spot landed Augustine, servant of the Lord, and his
companions, they say about forty of them. On the order of the
blessed Pope Gregory, they had taken interpreters from the
people of the Franks and they sent a message to Aethelberht
announcing they had come from Rome.
The interpreters must have known a Germanic language
near enough to one spoken in Kent. Though there were no
doubt scholars in Christian Britain, clergy and lay, who
could write in Latin, and presumably some even in pagan
Kent to handle diplomatic correspondence, there is no
evidence that any of them could write in Anglo-Saxon, even
if they could speak it. Augustine’s Frankish interpreters
may have been the first scholars with the technical skills to
write down dooms in a Germanic tongue. The existing oral
dooms were in Anglo-Saxon, so that was the language in
which it would be natural to write them when the
necessary skill could be called on.
Aethelberht’s dooms can be explained only if their
relationship to prevailing customary laws is understood. 27
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The fact that those laws were plural is the key. At least one
purpose of the first legislation was to deal with that plurality.
There was a place called Kent before the Romans
created a Romano-British civitas with its centre in
Canterbury. Some time in the fifth century that became
the eastern part of an Anglo-Saxon kingdom which
included a west Kent sub-kingdom, the former civitas
whose capital was Rochester. All the British in the two
civitates had their own customary law which for some may
have drawn on their old Roman law. Outside the civitates
customary law no doubt varied from one community to
another, as Kentish customs have done into modern times.
Even if all the Anglo-Saxons had the same customary law,
it could not have been the same as the Romano-British. As
there must have been more than one customary law,
anyone who had the task of resolving disputes needed
guidance, particularly where there was a conflict of laws.
That explains one purpose (though not of course the
content) of Aethelberht’s dooms. It is not surprising that
he was called on to speak, to lay down simplified principles
which would apply to the disputes of all his subjects where
uniformity was needed. Perhaps he wanted to encourage an
existing trend. As Hodgkin saw more than 50 years ago:
Kentish culture was a cross between Frankish and northern
cultures, with perhaps some mingling of a British strain in its
remoter ancestry (RH Hodgkin A History of the Anglo-
Saxons London, Oxford UP 3rd edn 2 vols, 1932 I pp98
and 101).
It has been suggested that Aethelberht wished to show
he was overlord of all Kent and proclaimed his laws to
bolster his position. But to what audience? He had more
direct ways to dissuade anyone who might challenge him.
It has also been said that his dooms offered a gentler
system than the old feud, exacting money rather than
blood, and that this shows a Christian influence. Such
pleasant thoughts are quickly dispelled not only by the
evidence of the Church’s support of the feud but also by
the cruelty with which it treated its opponents in this
world, with promises of even nastier suffering for its own
weaker brethren in the next.
No doubt there were many kinds of dispute which
Aethelberht could leave alone but not those which were
new and for which no customary law existed, for example
those which arose from recent conversion to Christianity
and the presence of powerful and demanding clergy.
When Aethelberht or his administrators adjudicated in a
dispute, they had first to find the right rule of law, as Gildas
insisted, and then apply it to the facts. When the king
spoke, his decree laid down the law not only for that
matter. He would not be intentionally inconsistent. He
could not handle all disputes himself. His delegates would
want to be consistent, too, and he would expect them to
be. Disputants themselves could reasonably expect
replicability. Augustine’s interpreters could please the king
by writing in something recognisable as his own language,
though he could not read it himself, which we now call
Anglo-Saxon or Old English. In writing down the king’s
dooms they gave priority to their own privileges, setting
them high.
It has been fashionable to call these collections codes but
that is inexcusable. The English word “code” means a
systematic collection arranged in order. They are
heterogeneous collections of edicts. The first evidence of
order has to wait for Alfred and then Edgar and Cnut.
The language of the dooms is simple. Those who used
them still had to remember them. Many decision-makers
would not have been able to read and all would be used to
memorising whatever rules they needed.
The word they use for payment is gylde, usually
translated “compensation.” That too is misleading and this
is not a legal or semantic quibble. It is vital for the
understanding of customary law to get this meaning right.
Compensation means payment of a sum calculated
according to the injured party’s loss. These are
reconciliation payments, made to buy off retaliation. There
may be payment without coin. Then customary legal
processes require great discrimination and expertise on the
part of the assessors. When I practised law in the
Highlands of Papua New Guinea in the 1980s I saw stakes
in a 20x20 grid, set in the assembly ground to take 400
pigs, each an individual of different value, which the
arbitrators had to assess before deciding whether a fight
between two clans should continue. Though the total
would be worth perhaps £100,000 today, and there was
plenty of money about then, customary law demanded at
least some of the reconciliation payment in pigs.
Though there had been a lack of coin in Britain since the
Romans left, by Aethelberht’s time that technology was
also to hand, which reduced but did not remove the
difficulties of assessment. What his collection of dooms
was intended to do was not only to iron out differences
between the customary laws but to extend them to new
offences, particularly against new categories of victim, the
churchmen. He was also astute to protect his own
interests. As king he could retaliate at any time in any way
he liked for any real or imagined wrong, though it might
not be politic to do so too arbitrarily, too often. But, when
his deputies had to adjudicate or assist in a settlement, or
when an assembly or other arbitral body was faced with an
injury to the king’s interest, he was letting them know what
payment to exact on his behalf. That would be multiplied
according to the status of the injured party. The amount
might also depend on the severity of the injury: different
amounts for damage to different teeth and fingers. They
need not have been what actually changed hands but they
acted as starting points for negotiating the final settlement.
10. HLOTHERE AND EADRED
When Aethelberht died in 616 (or 618) there were
many other kingdoms in Britain, large and small, Anglo-28
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Saxon and British. For most of the seventh century, all our
sources come from Kent. Only with Ine’s dooms from
Wessex at the end of the century can we begin to find out
what was happening elsewhere and make comparisons.
The same twelfth century manuscript which preserved
Aethelberht’s dooms contains texts of the laws attributed
to Hlothhere and Eadred, as well as those of Wihtred. If we
could be sure that it accurately represents the laws when
they were first declared, the rubric with which they begin
would be revealing:
“Hlothhere and Eadric, kings of the Kentish people, added to
the laws which their ancestors had made before, by these
dooms hereafter stated.”
Those words, however, may have been put there by any
of the scribes who copied the manuscript over the next
four centuries. Yet there is no reason to believe they are
untrue. Their natural sense is that the two kings added
these, their own decrees, to the existing laws of their
ancestors, who included Aethelberht.
These are laws of and for the Kentish people, to be
applied in the assemblies where those people or their
representatives make decisions. Anyone with any claim can
bring it before an assembly. Both claimant and defendant
must give surety of some kind and each must perform what
the decision-makers award.
It is not possible to say how long such a system of public
dispute resolution had operated but it has all the marks of
a well-established customary procedure and could well
predate the dooms of Aethelberht. This was the way the
Anglo-Saxons knew of preventing the feud ending in
violence. By the time of Hlothhere and Eadric the central
authority, the king of the Kentish peoples, was prepared
and powerful enough to declare an interest in assisting the
course of justice in the traditional assemblies or, put
another way, to bring ordinary claims within his
jurisdiction. There was still no distinction between civil
claims and criminal prosecutions, still no courts, or judges,
or lawyers. The feud still provided the underlying system of
enforcement. But there was now some established written
law.
11. THE DOOMS OF WIHTRED
Wihtred probably became undisputed king of all the
Kentish peoples in 694 after some years of power
struggles. His dooms may date from the following year.
They show how the relationship between customary and
written law was thought of then. The rubric and prologue,
no doubt added later, state:
These are the dooms of Wihtred, king of the Kentish
people… at Berghamstead… there was gathered a
deliberative assembly of the fortunate.
The “fortunate” – eadigan, what a lovely word for the
privileged, clerical and lay – are then listed, first Birhtwald,
archbishop of Britain, secondly “the aforesaid king”, then
“Gybmund, bishop of Rochester”, and every order of the
church unanimously with the “subject people”. It is the
“fortunate” who:
devised these dooms with the consent of all and added them to
the lawful customs of the Kentish people.
So it was clear to the writer of the prologue that this was
a legislative assembly at which the “fortunate” together
devised the dooms but that it was the whole assembly that
made them law by adding them to what was already the
law: “the lawful customs of the Kentish people.”
12. INE
Ine was king of Wessex and his dooms are the first to
survive from outside Kent. They were probably made just
before Wihtred’s. It seems likely that in Kent decisions
were taken collectively in some way, with the king’s
representative, if one were present, presiding rather than
deciding. The king was not usually involved directly. Ine’s
laws, however, show that in Wessex the ealdorman, the
king’s deputy, had a more individual and decisive role, with
the assembly responsible for fixing the amount of payment
or punishment. Ine’s prologue is not unlike Wihtred’s:
I, Ine, by God’s gift king of the Wessex people, with the
counsel etc … so that just law and just government should be
established and secured throughout our people, so that no
ealdorman or associate of ours shall henceforth depart from
these dooms of ours… we command that the customary law,
folces aew, and dooms, domas, of all the people be obeyed.
Ine 8 also makes it clear what procedural rules apply:
If anyone asks for justice before any shire official or other
decision-maker, dema, and he cannot get it, and [the
defendant] will not give him security, thirty shillings payment
and within seven nights do him the justice he deserves.
That places on decision-makers an obligation to do
justice to whoever asks for it. It also fixes the penalty to be
paid by a recalcitrant defendant. Ine 9 makes the necessary
complementary provision to stop self-help and compel all
those who want justice to follow the procedures now
established:
If anyone resorts to self-help, before asking for justice, he shall
give back what he has taken, and recompense, forgielde, and
thirty shillings payment, gebete.
13. ALFRED
Then the Scandinavians started to set up other systems
as they invaded and then settled. Alfred’s reign was always
troubled by them, yet he intervened in the administration
of justice in many more ways than his forebears. He
appointed ealdormen, whose responsibilities for the
administration of a shire included control of its assemblies.
He collected dooms and published them in writing and
taught the ealdormen to read so that they could take
instructions and he could supervise their performance. 29
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More than any earlier ruler, he used his legislative powers
to issue dooms to reform the law. Yet everything he did
presupposed a foundation of customary law. His own will
makes that clear. He wrote there that he had brought the
will of his father Aethelwulf before an assembly of the
whole witan and asked them to decide freely to recognise
its validity:
I urged them all… to declare what was right, that none of
them, from love or fear of me, would hesitate to apply the
customary law, folcriht (F E Harmer Select English
Historical Documents of the Ninth and Tenth
Centuries, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp15–19).
Not only in testamentary and other property matters,
such as the use of life interests in settlements, but wherever
no doom applied, as a general principle, customary law
provided the legal norms then and for centuries to come.
The legislation now regularly calls it folcriht.
Misconceptions have arisen because of errors in the
standard translations. Both Robertson and Attenborough
consistently translate folcriht as “public law”, perhaps
because they had their eyes on Liebermann’s translation,
Volksrecht, rather than the Anglo-Saxon (F L Attenborough,
The Laws of the Earliest English Kings New York, Russell 1963;
A J Robertson, The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund
to Henry I Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1925
repr 2 vols Felinfach, Lanerch 2000). But public law is a
concept and a phrase whose time did not come in English
for another thousand years.
14. EDGAR AND AETHELRED
Edgar succeeded in 959, ruling all England until 975.
The collection of his laws known as IV Edgar proclaims his
rights and those of his various peoples, English, Danish or
British. After Edgar, Aethelred the Unready ruled for 35
years, well into the next century. By then there is legislation
in the modern sense, no longer collections of dooms but
laws deliberated on by the witenagemot and enacted by the
king with their collaboration, by an established procedure
as part of a political programme.
There are three essential lessons to be learned from
these tenth-century sources. The first is that, though all
judicial business was still done in and by the assemblies,
their nature was changing, with royal representatives
playing a different role, less presidential and more judicial.
Secondly, though the kin remained essential in the system
of the feud, local groups determined geographically
according to residence were given greater jurisdiction.
When there were no longer kin groups which automatically
accepted responsibility for all their members, the
government needed other groupings to take their place.
Thirdly, customary law continued to be the foundation.
The early dooms reveal this by implication but by the end
of the century the dooms of Edmund and Edgar, and in the
next of Aethelred and Cnut reiterate it expressly.
For Edmund the customary law of the feud was still
fundamental:
If henceforth anyone kills another, he shall himself be subject
to the feud, unless he with his friends’ help within twelve
months pay the full wergeld according to his birth. If his kin
give him up and are unwilling to make a payment on his
behalf, then I will that all the kin except for the wrongdoer be
free from the feud, provided thereafter they give him neither
food nor shelter (II Edmund 1.1).
Any kinsman who later protected the wrongdoer
forfeited all his property to the king and became subject to
the feud again. Anyone from the victim’s kin who took
vengeance on anyone other than the wrongdoer forfeited
all his property to the king.
Edmund enjoined his witan to settle feuds and laid down
a procedure by which the wrongdoer appointed a
mediator, declaring this was the customary law, folcriht:
The witan shall settle feuds. First, according to customary
law, folcriht, the killer shall give a solemn promise to his
mediator, forspecan, and the mediator to the kin, that the
killer will make bot to the kin. Then after that the victim’s
kin shall give a solemn promise to that mediator that the
killer may approach under truce and pledge for the wergeld.
When he has made that pledge, then he finds a surety for the
wergeld. When that has been done it sets up the protection of
the king. Within 21 days healsfang is to be paid; 21 days
after that manbot; 21 days after that the frumgyld of the
wergild (II Edmund 7).
Healsfang was the first reconciliation payment, just
enough to stop the injured kin retaliating immediately, on
the understanding that there was more to come in
instalments. It might also be the most the killer’s kin could
raise on the spot. Both sides would be sensitive to the
realities. Manbot was the bot paid to the dead man’s lord.
Frumgyld was the first instalment of the balance of the
wergeld.
This doom restates with royal authority the procedure
required by customary law on a killing, making it simple,
homogeneous and universal. Could that procedure be what
customary law required generally, not just on a killing? Was
it common, if not obligatory, for the defendant in any feud
first to appoint a mediator, who would then go to the other
side and make an offer of bot?
15. FOLCRIHT AND DOOMS
And so, until the eleventh century, the various
assemblies provided the infrastructure of all public
decision-making. They all applied customary law. In earlier
periods the fundamental place of customary law has had to
be argued but the royal dooms of the tenth century
expressly insist on its application as the basic law. It applied
always and everywhere, unless overruled by specific
dooms, though there were differences particularly between30
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English and Danes. As Edward the Elder decreed (at I
Edward preamble):
King Edward commands all the reeves that you deem right
dooms as most right as you can and base them on the
doombooks. But do not neglect in any matter to take the
customary law, folcriht, into consideration.
And his collection of dooms ends with the general
exhortation (II Edward 8):
… every reeve shall make sure that everyone shall have the
benefit of the customary law, folcriht.
Aethelstan also stressed the importance of the
customary law’s general application. He would not allow
anyone to escape its grasp, making kin responsible for
assigning a place of residence to those who had no lord: “so
that they are domiciled within the customary law, folcryht”
(II Aethelstan 2).
Expressly in Aethelstan’s time, a thief found guilty
“according to customary law, folcriht,” should be put to
death (VI Aethelstan 1, of the ordinances which applied to
London – the city’s customary law!). An accused about to
undergo the ordeal had to swear that he was “not guilty of
the charge according to customary law” (II Aethelstan 23),
and an attachment of cattle had to be according to
customary law (II Aethelstan 9).
In the law setting out the procedure to be followed at
the assembly of the hundred, Edgar requires one who abets
an escape to: “exculpate himself as required in that place,
swa hit on lande stande….” That doom is specifically
required to show how the potential conflict of customary
laws is to be resolved and presumes that the laws differed
according to geography rather than kinship. It ends with
the general decree:
In the hundred, as in other assemblies, we require that
customary law be applied in every matter (I Edgar 7).
That last phrase is a jingle in Anglo-Saxon, “mon folcriht
getaece aet aelcere spaece”, something like:
Give folklaw a place
In every case.
I believe that is the sort of thing that everyone who
understood Anglo-Saxon learned as they grew up.
Edgar stated the basic principles even more plainly and
generally in his third collection of dooms:
Everyone shall have the benefit of the customary law,
folcriht, whether poor or rich, and be deemed right dooms
(III Edgar 1).
The idea of customary law as the basis for the control of
everyone’s relations (IV Edgar 14 and 15), supplemented
where the king thought necessary on the advice of his
witan, was no longer merely tacitly understood. It was the
fundamental constitutional principle on which the
kingdom of England was being expressly settled, for the
peace of the whole new folc.
16. CNUT
Cnut was king of Denmark and Norway and parts of
Sweden. As soon as he became king of England, he sought
to establish law and order on a foundation of the old legal
systems, for English and Danish alike but not identical. His
first decree is a set of laws declared in 1018 at a meeting in
Oxford of Danes and English, shortly after the fighting had
stopped: this decree, which differs from I and II Cnut, is in
a manuscript in Corpus Christi College, Cambridge 201
pp126-30. They re-enact Edgar’s laws not Aethelred’s.
Everything of his was discredited. Anyway he had copied
from Edgar, whose name had a resonance and an
acceptability to both sides. Prominence was given to
establishing the basic laws of each community:
3.1 Henceforth let every one, poor and rich, be entitled to
customary rights.
Customary rights, folcrihtes, are what you get when your
customary law is applied. Cnut made everyone responsible
for making the legal system work, not only those who make
decisions but even the parties. Two years later, Cnut
proclaimed the laws known since as I and II Cnut,
confirming the Oxford decree and restoring the old laws of
Edgar (Cnut Proclamation of 1020 13; II Cnut 1.1, folcrihtes).
17. CONCLUSION
No new laws made between 1023 and 1066 have
survived and it is unlikely that there were any but, just
before the Conquest, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle for 1065
says that on 27 October Edward the Confessor “renewed
there the laws of Cnut”.
So, at the Conquest, there were still no codes, no judges,
no lawyers. Traditional assemblies rather than courts
provided a working legal system based on customary law
supplemented by legislation, about whose procedures we
hear no complaints, whatever may be said about the
honesty of decision-makers or the fairness of the outcome.
Pollock, though he has been criticised as a historian, was
the most experienced lawyer of those who wrote legal
history in his time. He saw some things clearly:
Written laws and legal documents, being written for present
use and not for the purpose of enlightening future historians,
assume knowledge on the reader’s part of an indefinite mass
of received custom and practice. They are intelligible only
when they are taken as part of a whole which they commonly
give us little help to conceive (Sir Frederick Pollock,
“Anglo-Saxon Law”, (1893) 8 English Historical Review
239–71, 239).
That is as true of legal practice today.
We cannot comfortably relegate the first 37,000 years of
our legal history into some impenetrable Dark Age. The 31
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light was on all the time for those who lived then. It is up
to us to see as much as we can, even though the sources
allow only intermittent glimpses. This may persuade us to
think again about what Glanvill meant by consuetudines in
1190, or even Bracton in 1250, and more carefully about
what we mean when we speak of the development of the
common law a century after the Conquest. As Harold
Hazeltine said:
Anglo-Saxon laws and institutions survived the Conquest and
formed a material part of the system of common and local law
in later ages (H D Hazeltine “The Laws of the Anglo-
Saxons,” (1913) 29 Law Quarterly Review 387–98,
391).
[Let us hope that we never share the experience which
recently proved how customary law can comprehensively
take over when a modern legal system collapses. In 1991,
in the civil war in the Papua New Guinean province of
Bougainville, the state lost control. The Constitution and
the statute law to which it gave dominance evaporated. The
legal system ceased to function. There were no courts and
no police. Quite naturally the people turned back to their
customary laws to help them bring about reconciliation as
soon as they could once the bloodshed stopped, through
mediation of every kind of claim, but adopting also the
latest learning and modern practices of restorative justice.
We might find it harder and harsher to retrieve ours].
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